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..iusT1cE wt-1. J. BRENNAN, JR. February 23, 1972 
RE: No. 71-5552 - Cruz v. Beto 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissent in the 
above. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 




- ATTACHED IS A NOTE FROM JUSTICE WHITE 
INDICATING THAT HE JOINS JUSTICE DOUGLAS IN 
HIS DISSENT FROM THE DENIAL OF CERT, THIS 
IS THE CASE OF THE TEXTAS PRISONER CLAIMING 
THAT THE STATE IS INTERFERRING WITH HIS 
BUDDHIST RELIGION. 
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
February 24, 1972 
71-5552 - Cruz v. Beto 
Dear Bill, 
I would be glad to join your opinion in 
this case if you would be willing to add "and Four-
teenth" after "First" in the third line from bottom 
on page 4. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
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Re: No. 71-5552 - Cruz v. Beto 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
L. i 
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Mr. Justice Douglas 
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_,,. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: No. 71-5552 - Cruz v. ~ 
I gathered that while four voted to 
grant, none desires that the case be heard. 
Hence I inferred that I would prepare a 
Per Curiam which is attached. 
William o. Douglas 
, . 1· , ~•:i-;~ 
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Attached is (1) Justice Douglas's 5th Draft in Cruz v. 
Beto; (2) suggested riders to that opinion; (3) Justice Douglas's 
4th Draft with your notations on it; and (4) Justice Rehn-
quist's first draft. 
I have not made major changes in your suggestions. I 
understand the primary thrust of those two riders to be (1) 
the Court recognizes that discretion must be afforded prison 
officials in the administration of prisons; and (2) prisoners 
are entitled to comparable treatment in the exercise of their 
religious freedoms, i.e., it is the discrimination against 
one religious group which is at the heart of this case. But, 
at the same time, I think the opinion says more than that 
pris(in'Iers must be accorded equal protection in exercising 
religious rights. It also seems to say,· that, apart from the 
discrimination point, P.risoners, all prisoners, must be 
allowed to exercise their own religion. Some sects may be 
so small as not to require the same facilities afforded to 
the more numerous groups but, at the least, the prison cannot 
punish them for their beliefs and cannot interfere in the 
exercise of their beliefs. 
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ecirculated; 
FRED A. CRUZ v. GEORGE J . BETO, DIRECTOR,. 
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
No. 71-5552. Decided February - , 1972 
Memorandum of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST. 
Unlike MR. JusTICE DOUGLAS, I am not persuaded that 
petitioner's complaint states a claim under the First 
Amendment, nor that if the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals is vacated the trial court must necessarily con-
duct a trial upon the complaint. 1 
Under the First Amendment, of course, Texas may 
neither "establish a religion" nor may it "impair the 
free exercise" thereof. Petitioner alleges that voluntary 
services are made available at prison facilities so that 
Protestants, Catholics, and Jews may attend church 
services of their choice. None of our prior holdings 
indicate that such a program on the part of prison 
officials amounts to the establishment of a religion. 
Petitioner is a prisoner, serving 15 years for robbery 
in a Texas penitentiary. He is understandably not as 
free to practice his religion as if he were outside the: 
priwn walls. But there is no intimation in his ;1~:~ I 
that he is being punished for his religious view~ ;;; 
the case in Cooper v. Pate, 378 U. S. 546 ( 1964), where 
a prisoner was denied the receipt of mail about his 
religion. Cooper presented no question of interference 
1 MR. JusTICE DOUG LAS would "reverse for findings of fact" post, . 
at - . But of course the only procedural vehicle for making such 
findings in this ci,·il litigation would be the trial to which any civil 
litigant is entitled, inasmuch as this Court has never dealt with the 
special procedural problems presented by prisoners' civil suits. See-
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. (28 U. S. C.). 
11/ 
✓~~ 
2 CRUZ v. BETO 
"·ith prison administration of the type which would be 
involved here in retaining chaplains, scheduling the use 
of prison facilities, and timing the activities of various 
prisoners. 
None of our holdings under the First Amendment re-
quire that, in addition to being allowed freedom of 
religious belief, prisoners be allmved freely to evangelize 
their views among other prisoners. There is no indica- 'l 
tion in petitioner's complaint that the prison officials 
have dealt more strictly with his efforts to convert other 
convicts to Buddhism than with efforts of communicants 
of other faiths to make similar conversions. 
By reason of his status petitioner is obviously limited 
in the extent to which he may practice his religion. He 
is assuredly not free to attend the church of his choice 
outside the prison walls. But the fact that the Texas 
prison system offers no Buddhist services at this par-
ticular prison does not, under the circumstances pleaded 
in his complaint, demonstrate that his religious freedom 
is being impaired. Presumably prison officials are not 
obligated to provide facilities for any particular denomi-
national services within a prison, although once they 
undertake to provide them for some they must make 
only such reasonable distinctions as may survive analysis 




What petitioner's basic claim amounts to is that be-
cause prison facilities are provided for denominational 
services for religions with more numerous followers, the _ ·~J. 11/ 
failure to provide prison facilities for Buddhist services l ~ ~ .~ • 
amounts to a denial of the equal protection ,2f the Jl.l.ws. ."L--t ~- , 
There is no indication from petitioner's complaint how 1 rrr· 
r~any practicing__ Buddhists there are in the particular 
prison facility in which he is incarcerated, nor is there 
any indication of the demand upon available facilities 
for other prisoner activities. 
No fully argued case in this Court, as opposed to 
occasional summary reversals of the dismissal of a pris-
cnuz V. BETO 3 
oner's civil rights complaint 2 has ever given full con-
sideration to the proper balance to be struck between 
prisoners' rights and the extensive administrative dis-
cretion which must rest with correction officials. I 
would apply the rule of deference to administrative dis-
cretion which has been overwhelmingly accepted in the 
courts of appeals." Failing that, I would at least hear 
argument as to what rule should govern. 
A long line of decisions by this Court has recognized 
that the "equal protection of the laws" guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment is not to be applied in a 
precisely equivalent way in the multitudinous fact situa-
tions which may confront the courts.' On the one hand, 
we have held that racial classifications are "invidious" 
and "suspect." 5 I think it quite consistent with the 
intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
many of whom would doubtless be surprised to know 
that convicts came within its ambit, to treat prisoner 
claims at the other end of the spectrum from claims of 
racial discrimination. Absent a complaint alleging facts 
showing that the difference in treatment between peti-
tioner and his fellow Buddhists and practitioners of 
more numerous denominations could not reasonably be 
2 Haines v. K erner, - U. S. - (1972): Houghton v. Shafer, 
392 U. S. 639 (1968) ; L ee v. Washington, 390 U. S. 333 (1968) ; 
Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) . 
3 Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F. 2d 684, 688 (CA8 1967) ; Carey v. 
Settle, 351 F . 2d 483 (CA8 1965); Carswell v. Wainwright, 413 F. 
2d 1044 (CA5 1969); Walker v. Pate, 356 F. 2d 502 (CA71966) . 
I do not re{ld Johnson v. A very, 393 U. S. 483 (1969), which was 
concerned with the prisoners' traditional remedy of habens corpus, 
to reach the issue of a statutory civil cause of action such as 42 
U. S. C. § 1983. 
4 Sec generally McGoican v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961); 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970); F. S. Royster Guano 
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412 (1920) ; Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 
68 (1968) ; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
5 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U. S. 214 (1966). 
.> 
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justified under any rational hypothesis, I would leave 
the matter in the hands of the prison officials.c 
It has been assumed that the dismissal by the trial 
court must be treated as proper only if the standard of 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, would permit the grant of 
a motion under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (b) 6. But it 
is evident from the record before us that the complaint 
might ,vell have been dismissed as frivolous, under the 
discretion vested in the trial court in 28 U. S. C. § 1915 
(d): Under 28 U. S. C. § 1915 the trial court may dis-
miss an in fonna pauperis complaint if satisfied that the 
action is frivolous or malicious. This power is not limited 
or impaired by the strictures of Rule 12 (b). Fletcher 
v. Young, 222 F. 2d 222 ( CA4 1955). Although the trial 
court cast this dismissal on 12 (b) 6 grounds, this record 
would strongly support a dismissal as frivolous. 
The State's answer to the complaint showed that the 
identical issues of religious freedoms were litigated by 
another prisoner from the same institution, claiming the 
same impairment of the practice of the Buddhist religion, 
which was brought by the attorney employed at the 
prison to provide legal services for the inmates. It is 
not clear whether petitioner here was a party to that 
suit, as he was to many suits filed by his fellow prisoners. 
If he was, the instant claim may be barred under the 
doctrine of res adjudicata. In any event, a prior adjudi-
cation of the same claim by another prisoner under identi-
6 Plaintiffs (represented by a lawyer who drafted the complaint) 
alleged only that they were excluded from participating in the re-
ligious programs already established (which is probably not what 
they mean), and that the exclusion was "arbitrary and unreason-
able ... without any lawful justification." Holding their counsel to 
standards of pleading applied to other prisoners' claims for relief, 
conclusions of arbitrariness are insufficient, e. g., Williams v. Dunbar, 
377 F. 2d 505 (CA9 1967); United States ex rel. Hoge v. Bolsinger, 
311 F. 2d 215 (CA3 1962). 
7 R eece v. Washington, 310 F. 2d 139 (CA9 1962); Conway v. 
Oliver, 429 F. 2d 1307 ( CA9 1970) . 
~ 
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cal circumstances would be a substantial factor in a de-
cision to dismiss this claim as frivolous. 
In addition, the trial court had before it the dismissal 
of another of petitioner's cases filed shortly before the 
instant action , where the trial judge had been exposed 
to myriad previous actions, and found them to be "vol-
uminous, repetitious, duplicitous and in many instances 
deceitful. " 8 Whether petitioner might have raised his 
claim in these or several other actions in which he joined 
other prisoner plaintiffs is also proper foundation for a 
finding that this complaint is "frivolous or malicious." 
Whatever might be the posture of this constitutional 
claim if petitioner had never flooded the courts with 
repetitive and duplicitous claims, and if it had not re-
cently been adjudicated in an identical proceeding, I be-
lieve it can be dismissed as frivolous in the case before us. 
In sum, I would not approve petitioner's complaint as 
stating a claim for relief. Moreover, if the opinion be 
vacated, this Court should not restrict the permissible 
disposition by the trial court to a full blown trial. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNI'fEILST1Lf~ "', .J. 
FRED A. CRUZ V. GEORGE J. BETO,c1:fritEm6R--
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CORR£Q'f.J&lf1~t ed : $ & 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
No. 71-5552. Decided March 6, 1972 
PER Cui:uAM. 
The complaint, alleging a cause of action under 42 
U. S. C. § 1983, states that Cruz is a Buddhist, who is 
in a Texas prison. While prisoners who are members 
of other religious sects are allowed to use the prison 
chapel, Cruz is not. He shared his Buddhist religious 
material with other prisoners and, according to the alle-
gations, in retaliation was placed in solitary confinement 
on a diet of bread and water for two weeks, without access 
to newspapers, magazines, and all other sources of news. 
He also alleged that he was prohibited from correspond-
ing with his religious advisor in the Buddhist sect. Those 
in the isolation unit spend 22 hours a day in total idleness. 
Again, according to the allegations, Texas encourages 
inmates to participate in other religious programs; pro-
viding at state expense chaplains of the Catholic, Jewish, 
and Protestant faiths, providing also at state expense 
copies of the Jewish and Christian Bibles, conducting 
·weekly Sunday school classes and religious services. 
According to the allegations, points of good merit are 
given prisoners as a reward for attending orthodox reli-
gious services, those points enhancing a prisoner's eligi-
bility for desirable job assignments and early parole 
consideration.1 Respondent ansvYered, denying the alle-
gations and moving to dismiss. 
1 The amended complaint alleges, inter alia: 
"Plaintiff is an inmate of the Texas Dep:utment of Corrections 
and is a member of the Buddhist Churches of America. At the time 
2 CRUZ v. BETO 
The Federal District Court denied relief without a 
hearing or without any findings, saying the complaint 
was in an area that should be left "to the sound dis-
of filing of this suit , he was inc.'.lrcernted at the Eastham unit and 
has since been tr:ui,~frrred to the Ellis unit. There is a substantial 
number of prisoners in the Texas Department of Corrections who 
either are adherents of the Buddhist Faith or who wish to explore 
the gospel of Buddhism ; hO\rnver, the Defendants have refused in 
the p:1st, and continue to refuse, Buddhists the right to hold religious 
sen·ices or to dis~emin:tte the teachings of Buddha. The Plaintiff 
has been pren'nted by the Defendants from borrowing or lending 
Buddhist religious books and materi:11s and h.'.l s been punished by said 
Defendants br being placed in solita ry confinement on a diet of 
bread and water for two "·eeks for sharing his Buddhist religious 
material with other prisoners. 
"Despite repeated requests to Defendants for the use of prison 
chapel facilities for the purpose of holding Buddhist religious sen ·ices 
:1nd the denials thereof the Defendants have promulgated customs 
and regulations which maintain a religious program \Yithin the penal 
system under which: 
"A. Consecrated chaplins of the Protestant . J ewish and Roman 
Catholic religions at sfatc expense are a~signed to vnrious units. 
"B. Copies of the Ho!:, Bible (Jewish and Christian) are dis-
tributed at stat e expense free to all prisoners. 
"C. Religious sen ·ices and religious classes for Protestant, Jewish 
and Roman Catholic adherents arc held regular!.\· in chapel facilities 
erected at sta te expense for 'non-denominational' purposes. 
"D. Records are maintained by Defend:rnts of religious partici-
pation by inmates . 
"E. Religious participation is encouraged on inmates by the De-
fendants as necrssary steps tO\rnrd true rehabilitation. 
"F. Points of good merit are giYen to inmates by the Defendants 
as a reward for religious participation in Protestant, Jewish and 
Roman Catholic faiths which enhance on inmates eligibility for pro-
motions in class, job assignment and parole. 
"Because inmates of the Buddhist faith are being denied the right 
to participate in the religious program made available for Protestant, 
J ewish and Roman Catholic faiths by the Defendants, Plaintiff and 
the members of the class he represents are being subjected to an arbi-
trary and unreasonable exclusion without any lawful justification 
which i.t1\·idiously discriminates against them in violation of their 
constitutional right of religious freedom and denies them equal pro-
tection of the laws." 
\. 
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cretion of prison administration." It went on to say, 
"Valid disciplinary and security reasons not known to 
this court may prevent the 'equality' of exercise of reli-
gious practices in prisons." The Court of Appeals 
affirmed. 445 F. 2d 801. 
Federal courts sit not to supervise prisons but to en-
force the constitutional rights of all "persons" which in-
clude prisoners. We are not unmindful that prison 
officials must be accorded latitude in the administration 
of prison affairs, and that prisoners necessarily are sub-
ject to appropriate rules and regulations. But persons in 
prison, like other individuals, have the right to petition 
the Government for redress of grievances which, of course, 
includes "access of prisoners to the courts for the pur-
pose of presenting their complaints." Johnson v. Avery, 
393 U. S. 483, 485; Ex parte Hull, 312 U. S. 546, 549. 
See also Younger v. Gilrnore, 404 U. S. 15, aff'g Gilrnore [ 
v. Lynch, 319 F . Supp. 105 (ND Cal.). Moreover, racial 
segregation, which is unconstitutional outside prisons, 
is unconstitutional within prisons, save for "the neces-
sities of prison security and discipline." Lee v. Wash-
ington, 390 U. S. 333. Even more closely in point 
is Cooper v. Pate, 378 U. S. 546, where we reversed a 
dismissal of a complaint brought under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983. We said "Taking as true the allegations of 
the complaint, as they must be on a motion to dismiss, 
the complaint stated a cause of action ." I bid. The 
allegation made by that petitioner was that solely be-
cause of his religious beliefs he was denied permission 
to purchase certa.in religious publications and denied 
other privileges enjoyed by other prisoners. 
We said in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46, that 
"A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim which would entitle him to relief." 
If Cruz was a Buddhist and if he was denied a reason-
able opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the 
., 
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opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to con-
ventional religious precepts, then there was palpably 
discrimination by the State against the Buddhist religion, 
established 600 B. C., long before the Christian era. 2 
The First Amendment applicable to the States by reason 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Torca,So v. Watkins , 367 
U. S. 488, 492-493, prohibits government from making 
a law "prohibiting the free exercise of religion." If the' 
allegations of this complaint are assumed to be true, as 
they must be on the motion to dismiss, Texas has vio-
lated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment is 
vacated, and the cause remanded for a hearing and ap-
propriate findings. 
So ordered .. 
2 We do not suggest, of course, that every religious sect or group-
wit hin a prison-however few in numbers-must have identi cal facili-
ties or personnel. A special chapel or place of worship need not be 
provided for every faith regardless of size; nor must a chaplin, priest 
or minister be provided without regard for the extent of the demand. 
But reasonable opportunities must be afforded t o all prisoners to 
exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Four-• 
t eenth Amendments without fear of penalty . 
•' 
s 
To: The Ch1ef Just ·c~ 
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Mr. Just ice Pre~~~ ~ 
Mr. Justice Ste ~rt 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Har-:il-i•1ll 
3rd DRAFT 
Mr. Justice Bl?c'mun 
Mr. Justice Powell L-
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED SJAJ~ehnquist, J. 
FRED A. CRUZ v. GEORGE J. BET O, DIR~~floi}~ted: _____ _ 
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS -:3 l(/7-i__ Recirculated: _ __:/_ l ;_, __ _ 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
No. 71-5552. Decided February - , 1972 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
Unlike the Court, I am not persuaded that petitioner's 
complaint states a claim under the First Amendment, 
nor that if the opinion of the Court of Appeals is vacated 
the trial court must necessarily conduct a trial upon the 
complaint.1 
Under the First Amendment, of course, Texas may 
neither "establish a religion" nor may it "impair the 
free exercise" thereof. Petitioner alleges that voluntary 
services are made available at prison facilities so that 
Protestants, Catholics, and Jews may attend church 
services of their choice. None of our prior holdings 
indicates that such a program on the part of prison 
officials amounts to the establishment of a religion. 
Petitioner is a prisoner, serving 15 years for robbery 
in a Texas penitentiary. He is understandably not as 
free to practice his religion as if he were outside the 
prison walls. But there is no intimation in his pleadings 
that he is being punished for his religious views, as was 
the case in Cooper v. Pate, 378 U. S. 546 (1964), where 
a prisoner was denied the receipt of mail about his 
religion. Cooper presented no question of interference 
1 The Court "Remand[s] for a hearing and appropriate findings," 
ante, at -. But of course the only procedural vehicle for making 
such findings in this civil litigation \\·ould be the trial to which any 
civil litigant is entitled, inasmuch as this Court has neYer dealt with 
the special procedural problems presented by prisoners' civil suits. 
See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. (28 U. S. C.). 
2 CRUZ v. BETO 
" ·ith prison administration of the type which would be 
involved here in retaining chaplains, scheduling the use 
of prison facilities, and timing the activities of various 
prisoners. 
None of our holdings under the First Amendment re-
quires that, in addition to being allowed freedom of 
religious belief, prisoners be allowed freely to evangelize 
their views among other prisoners. There is no indica-
tion in petitioner's complaint that the prison officials 
have dealt more strictly with his efforts to convert other 
convicts to Buddhism than with efforts of communicants 
of other faiths to make similar conversions. 
By reason of his status petitioner is obviously limited 
in the extent to which he may practice his religion. He 
is assuredly not free to attend the church of his choice 
outside the prison walls. But the fact that the Texas 
prison system offers no Buddhist services at this par-
ticular prison does not, under the circumstances pleaded 
in his complaint, demonstrate that his religious freedom 
is being impaired. Presumably prison officials are not 
obligated to provide facilities for any particular denomi-
national services within a prison, although once they 
undertake to provide them for some they must make 
only such reasonable distinctions as may survive analysis 
under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause. 
·what petitioner's basic claim amounts to is that be-
cause prison facilities are provided for denominational 
services for religions with more numerous followers, the· 
failure to provide prison facilities for Buddhist services 
amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the laws. 
There is no indication from petitioner's complaint how 
many practicing Buddhists there are in the particular 
prison facility in which he is incarcerated, nor is there· 
any indication of the demand upon available facilities 
for other prisoner activities. Neither the decisions of 
this Court after full argument, nor those summarily re-
versing the dismissal of a prisoner's civil rights com-
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plaint 2 have ever given full consideration to the proper 
balance to be struck between prisoners' rights and the 
extensive administrative discretion which must rest with 
correction officials. I ,rnuld apply the rule of deference 
to administrative discretion which has been ovenvhelm-
ingly accepted in the courts of appeals. 3 Failing that, 
I would a.t least hear argument as to ,vhat rule should 
govern. 
A long line of decisions by this Court has recognized 
that the "equal protection of the laws" guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment is not to be applied in a 
precisely equivalent way in the multitudinous fact situa-
tions which may confront the courts:1 On the one hand, 
,rn have held that racial classifications are "invidious" 
and "suspect." " I think it quite consistent with the 
intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
many of whom would doubtless be surprised to know 
that convicts came within its ambit, to treat prisoner 
claims at the other end of the spectrum from claims of 
racial discrimination. Absent a complaint alleging facts 
showing that the difference in treatment between peti-
tioner and his fellow Buddhists and practitioners of 
2 Ha.ines v. K erner, - U.S. - (1972); Young er v. Gilmore, 
404 U. S. 15 (1971) ; Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639 (1968); 
L ee v. Washington , 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Cooper \". Pate, 378 U.S. 
546 (1964) . 
3 Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F. 2d 684, 688 (CA8 1967) ; Carey v. 
Settle, 351 F. 2d 483 (CA8 1965) ; Carswell v. Wainwright, 413 F. 
2d 1044 (CA5 1969) ; Walker v. Pate, 356 F. 2d 502 (CA7 1966) . 
I do not re.1 d Johnson v. A very, 393 U. S. 483 (1969), which was 
concerned with the prisoners' traditional remed~, of habeas corpus, 
to reach the issue of a statutory civil cn use of action such as 42 
U. S. C. § 1983. 
4 See generall:v McGoica.n v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961); 
Dandridge v. ·williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970); F. S. Royster Guano 
Co. v. Virginia , 253 U. S. 412 (1920) ; L evy v. Louisiana., 391 U. S. 
68 (1968); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) , as an example 
of the spectrum of Fourteenth Amendment re,·iew standards. 
5 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); K orema.tsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1966). 
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more numerous denominations could not reasonably be· 
justified under any rational hypothesis, I would leave 
the matter in the hands of the prison officials.6 
It has been assumed that the dismissal by the trial 
court must be treated as proper only if the standard of 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 , ;yould permit the grant of 
a motion under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (b) 6. I would 
not require the District Court to inflexibly apply this 
general principle to the complaint of every inmate, who 
is in many respects in a different litigating posture than 
those who are unconfined. The inmate stands to gain 
something and lose nothing from a complaint stating 
facts which he is ultimately unable to prove.7 Though 
6 Petitioner (represented by a lawyer who drafted the complaint),. 
alleged that he was excluded from participation in religious programs 
and that the exclusion was "arbitrary and unreasonable .. . without 
any lawful justifi cation." Holding counsel to standards of pleading 
applied to other prisoners' claims for relief, conclusions of arbitrari-
ness are insufficient , e. g. , Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F. 2d 505 (CA9 
1967); United States ex rel. Hoge v. B olsinger, 311 F . 2d 215 (CA3 
1962). 
7 "The last type of writ-,niter to be discussed wri tes writs for 
economic gain. This group is comprised of a few unscrupulous 
manipulators who are interested only in acquiring from other pris-
oners money, cigarettes or merchandise purchased in the inmate 
canteen. Once they have a 'client's' interest aroused and determine 
his ability to pay, they must keep him on the 'hook.' This is com-
monly done by deliberately misstating the facts of his case so that 
it appears, at least on the surface, that the inmate is entitled to 
relief. The documents drafted for the client cast the wri t-wri ter 
in the role of a sympath etic protagonist. After reading them, the 
inmate is elated that he has found someone able to present his case 
favorably. He is willing to pay to maintain the lie that has been 
created for him." 
Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 343, 348-
349 (1968) . 
"When decisions do not help a writ-writer, he may employ a handful 
of tricks which damage his image in the state courts. Some of the 
not too subtle subterfuges used by a small minority of writ writers 
,rnuld tax the credulity of any lawyer. One writ-writer simply 
made up his own legal citations when he ran short of actual ones. 
In one action against the California Adult Authority im·olving the 
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he may be denied legal relief, he will nonetheless have· 
obtained a short sabbatical in the nearest federal court-
house.8 To expand the availability of such courtroom 
appearances by requiring the District Court to construe 
every inmate's complaint under the liberal rule of Conley 
v. Gibson, deprives those courts of the latitude necessary 
to process this ever-increasing species of complaint.9 
Finally, a factual hearing should not be imperative on 
remand if dismissal is appropriate on grounds other than 
failure to state a claim for relief. It is evident from the-
application of administratiYe law, one writ-writer used the following 
citations: Aesop v. Fables, First Baptist Church v. Sally Stan! ord, 
Doda v. One Forty-Four Inch Chest and Dogood v. The Planet 
Earth. The references to the volumes and page numbers of the 
nonexistent publications were equally fantastic, such as 901 Penal· 
Review, page 17,240. To accompany each case, he composed an 
eloquent decision which, if good law,, would make selected acts of the 
Adult Authority unconstitut ional. In time the 'decisions' freely cir-
culated among other writ-writers, and several gullible ones began 
citing them also ." Id., at 355. 
8 "[TJ emporary relief from prison confinement is ahrn.ys an allur-
ing prospect, and to the hardened criminal the possibility of escape 
lurks in eYery excursion beyond prison walls." Price v. Johnston, 
159 F. 2d 234, 237 (CA9 1947). 
9 Cf. Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 284-285 (1948), giving to 
the courts of appeal the necessary discretion to determine when 
prisoners should be allowed to argue their habeas corpus appeals in 
person: 
"If it is apparent that the request of the prisoner to argue person-
ally reflects something more than a mere desire to be freed tem-
porarily from the confines of the prison, that he is capable of con-
ducting an intelligent and responsible argument, and that his 
presence in the courtroom may be secured without undue incon-
venience or danger, the court would be justified in issuing the writ." 
Here, the question is whether prisoners can in every case be per-
mitted to file a complaint, conduct the full range of pretrial dis-
covery, and commence a trial (including presumably trial by jury) 
at which he and other prisoners will appear as witnesses. The sum-
mary reversal effected here encourages such a result without permit-
ting the district courts to exercise the type of discretion permitted 
in Price and without providing any guidance for their accommodation 
of the special problems of prisoner litigation with a fair determination 
of such complaints under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 as are rightfully filed ._ 
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record before us that the in f orma pauperis complaint 
might well have been dismissed as "frivolous of mali-
cious," under the discretion vested in the trial court in 
28 U. S. C. § 1915 (d). 10 This power is not limited or 
impaired by the strictures of Rule 12 (b). Fletcher v. 
Young, 222 F . 2d 222 (CA4 1955). Although the trial 
court based its dismissal on 12 (b) 6 grounds, this record 
would support a dismissal as frivolous. 
The State's answer to the complaint showed that the 
identical issues of religious freedoms were litigated by 
another prisoner from the same institution, claiming the 
same impairment of the practice of the Buddhist religion, 
which was brought by the attorney employed at the 
prison to provide legal services for the inmates. It is 
not clear whether petitioner here was a party to that 
suit, as he was to many suits filed by his fellow prisoners. 
If he was, the instant claim may be barred under the 
doctrine of res judicata. In any event, a prior adjudi-
cation of the same claim by another prisoner under identi-
cal circumstances would be a substantial factor in a de-
cision to dismiss this claim as frivolous. 
In addition, the trial court had before it the dismissal 
of another of petitioner's cases filed shortly before the 
instant action, where the trial judge had been exposed 
to myriad previous actions, and found them to be "vol-
uminous, repetitious, duplicitous and in many instances 
deceitful." 11 Whether petitioner might have raised his 
claim in these or several other actions in which he joined 
other prisoner plaintiffs is also proper foundation for a 
finding that this complaint is "frivolous or malicious." 
Whatever might be the posture of this constitutional 
claim if petitioner had never flooded the courts with 
repetitive and duplicitous claims, and if it had not re-
cently been adjudicated in an identical proceeding, I be-
lieve it can be dismissed as frivolous in the case before us. 
10 Reece v . Washington, 310 F. 2d 139 (CA9 1962); Conway v. 
Oliver, 429 F. 2d 1307 (CA9 1970). 
11 Transcript of Record, p. 31. 
